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Respectively in the public and in the private spheres, both sovereignty 
and property are expressions of the turn to the primacy of the interests 
of the individual at the beginning of the Modern Ages: in the first case 
this primacy is related to the individual state, in the second to the 
individual economic actor. The centrality of individuality, as the most 
distinguishing feature of modern thinking, thus lies at the basis of the 
interconnection between the two concepts. This is developed according 
to three distinct patterns. In the light of the first pattern, sovereignty 
degenerates into a mere means in the service of defending private 
interests, thereby eluding its fundamental public function. On the other 
hand, from the perspective of the second pattern, individual property 
leaves the private domain, claiming absoluteness and presuming to 
replace the public dimension. Both these patterns reflect one-sided 
relations in which the two terms — sovereignty and property — 
merge in opposite ways, but always losing their specific content and 
rationale in the context of the social order. The third pattern is the 
only one in which sovereignty and property maintain their respective 
functions, with the two elements synergistically contributing to a 
social order in which public sphere and private dimension are both 
recognized as essential components. Here, public sovereignty and 
private property are co-essential insofar as sovereignty derives from 
individual will, private property is fundamental for the individual 
to pursue the personal self-realization that lies at the basis of his/
her legitimation of sovereignty, and — finally — public power is at 
the service of defending the rights and interests of all individuals.
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IntroductIon
Sovereignty can be described as the condition in which a legitimate political 
actor is self-reliant or autonomous, in the sense that it does not have to recognize 
any other rules than those it has assigned to itself. To avoid misunderstandings, a 
clarification regarding this definition is due. Indeed, the traditional understanding 
of sovereignty implies that the sovereign political actor does not consider 
itself bound by any obligation towards noncitizens. Yet this conclusion is not 
necessary: it depends, indeed, on how legitimacy and autonomy are conceived 
of. If legitimacy is understood as involving responsibility also towards those 
who are not members of the polity,1 and autonomy is ascribed to actors who 
are aware of their plural belongings — in particular of their being part of an 
individual polity as well as of humanity as a whole — then sovereignty need 
not be related to selfishness and to indifference towards others.2 In any event, 
be it selfishly particularistic or open to universalism and cosmopolitism, 
sovereignty is a concept located predominantly in the public sphere: it is the 
public actor — specifically the state — that claims to be sovereign in order to 
implement a certain idea of the common good. On the contrary, property — as 
the entitlement to possess resources that enable the individual to pursue his 
or her preferences — belongs essentially to the private domain.
Despite their belonging respectively to the opposite sides of the traditional 
divide between public and private, sovereignty and property are deeply 
intertwined in many senses.3 Respectively in the public and in the private 
spheres, both sovereignty and property are expressions of the turn to the primacy 
of the interests of the individual at the beginning of modernity: in the first case 
this primacy is related to the individual state, in the second to the individual 
economic actor. As is stressed in Part I, the new centrality of individuality 
thus lies at the basis of the interconnection between the two concepts and 
1 With regard to the arguments for and against the existence of an obligation 
of solidarity towards aliens, see Sergio Dellavalle, Opening the Forum to the 
“Others”: Is There an Obligation to Take Non-National Interests into Account 
Within National Political and Juridical Decision-Making-Processes?, 6 GöttinGer 
J. int’l l. 217 (2014).
2 On the conditions for a solidaristic concept of legitimate sovereignty, see 
Sergio Dellavalle, On Sovereignty, Legitimacy, and Solidarity; Or: How Can a 
Solidaristic Idea of Sovereignty Be Justified?, 16 theoretical inquiries l. 367 
(2015).
3 The interconnection between sovereignty and property, as well as the problems 
that can arise from not maintaining a basic distinction between their respective 
fields of application, was already pointed out, ninety years ago, by Morris R. 
Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 cornell l. rev. 8 (1927).
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the praxis of their development. Yet the correlation between sovereignty and 
property takes not just one form; rather, it has evolved in the course of time 
into three different patterns. Two of them reflect one-sided relations in which 
the two terms — sovereignty and property — merge in opposite ways, but 
always losing their specific contents and rationale in the context of the social 
order. As a result, according to the first pattern, which is examined in Part 
II, sovereignty degenerates into a mere means in the service of defending 
private interests, thereby eluding its fundamental public function. On the 
contrary, from the perspective of the second pattern, which is examined in 
Part III, individual property leaves the private domain, claiming absoluteness 
and presuming to replace the public dimension. On this understanding, the 
system of private property is assumed to be not only independent of the 
public domain, but downright “constitutional” in essence. Not recognizing 
any power above itself, the system of private property demands sovereignty.
The third pattern, which is examined in Part IV, is the only one in which 
sovereignty and property maintain their respective functions, with the two 
elements synergistically contributing to a social order in which public sphere 
and private dimension are both recognized as essential components. Here, 
public sovereignty and private property are co-essential insofar as sovereignty 
derives from individual will, private property is fundamental for the individual 
to pursue the personal self-realization that lies at the basis of his/her legitimation 
of sovereignty, and — finally — public power is at the service of defending 
the rights and interests of all individuals. The main contents of the research, 
with the addition of some concluding remarks, are then summarized in Part V.
I. SovereIgnty and ProPerty: two concePtS at the  
ServIce of the develoPment of IndIvIdualIty
Sovereignty and property are both conceptual products of the rise of individuality 
in the transition from the Middle Ages to the Modern Ages.4 More specifically, 
4 Martti Koskenniemi has recently led the interconnection between sovereignty and 
property back rather to the “dark side” of the shift to modernity in the Western 
world, i.e., to the imperialistic denial of collective identity and possession. 
See Martti Koskenniemi, Histories of International Law: Significance and 
Problems for a Critical View, 27 temple int’l & comp. l.J. 215 (2013); Martti 
Koskenniemi, Sovereignty, Property and Empire: Early Modern English Contexts, 
18 theoretical inquiries l. 355 (2017). The necessary recognition of the “dark 
side” of the modern rise of individualism should not make us blind, however, 
to the “bright side” that might have been present as well. In my contribution, I 
will rather concentrate on this second aspect.
272 Theoretical Inquiries in Law [Vol. 18:269
the concept of sovereignty expresses the rising awareness that the public 
interest of the individual political community — or its idea of the common 
good — cannot be simply led back to the primacy of the homeostasis of the 
holon, and eventually sacrificed on its altar. On the other hand — moving 
from the public to the private dimension — it was the recognition of the 
search for the highest payoffs by the individual economic actor as a value, 
which took the form of a growing acknowledgment and protection of property, 
that challenged in an unprecedented way the idea that the homeostasis of 
the community as a whole should be seen as by far more important than the 
self-realization of its individual members.
Starting with the public dimension, the role of the rise of sovereignty in 
boosting the principle of individuality becomes evident if we bear in mind 
how public power was understood before the paradigmatic revolution that 
led to modernity. In fact, in the ancient world the single public power was 
regarded as aiming primarily at pursuing not self-reliance, but an internal 
social balance that reflected a general idea of world order. As a result of 
this attitude, both Plato’s “justice”5 and Aristotle’s “happiness”6 — as the 
most influential concepts of the political philosophy of antiquity — express 
attempts, quite different in their theoretical approach but united in their 
main purpose, to stabilize interactions within the political community, rather 
than to strengthen its stance vis-à-vis competing polities. Admittedly, some 
other ancient authors, the most prominent of whom is surely Thucydides, 
concentrate their analysis more on the conflict between poleis than on the 
reasons for internal balance. Nevertheless, even in their view the proneness 
to resorting to war in order to resolve inter-state divergences is a pathology to 
be prevented, though a frequent one; indeed, it results from a loss of stability 
in favor of an increase in unfettered selfishness, which eventually leads to the 
unleashing of the more disruptive tendencies of human nature.7 In any case, 
the aim of a well-ordered public power in ancient thought never consisted in 
defending individual preferences. 
Even more distant — if possible — from the idea of the self-reliance 
of the individual polity was the political philosophy of the Middles Ages. 
Here, the public power of the single political community was conceived as 
part of a superior order of natural or divine origin. In fact, as we can see in 
the works of Thomas Aquinas, human law is always derived, in a first step, 
5 plato, republic bk. II, 367e et seq. (1901).
6 aristotle, nichomachean ethics bk. I ch. 5, 1097a et seq. (1890); aristoteles, 
politics bk. VII, ch. 2, 1324 et seq. (1967) [hereinafter aristotle, politics].
7 thucydides, the peloponnesian War bk. I, para. 75 et seq. (Thomas Hobbes 
trans., Univ. of Mich. Press 1959) (431 B.C.); id. bk. III, para. 82.
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from natural law,8 and in a second from eternal law, from which every just 
law must be drawn.9 Furthermore, “civil law” as the law of the social and 
political community has the task of guaranteeing the realization of the moral 
“last end” of all human beings, which is — as in Aristotle’s moral philosophy 
— “happiness.”10 And “happiness” — also here analogously to the vision of 
the Greek philosopher — does not consist of wealth, honor, glory, power, or 
pleasure, but of the search for the theoretical truth — being here in a Christian 
context, of the contemplation of God.11 Against this background, Dante 
Alighieri went so far as to say that the only legitimate public power, namely 
the “universal monarchy,” does not have to guarantee peace, liberty and justice 
either for the sake of the individual’s wellbeing, or for the advantage of some 
specific social or political group, but only in order to enable all human beings 
to concentrate on the theological “last end.”12 
As a consequence of this approach, public power is only legitimate if it 
does not intend to maximize selfish gains, but shapes its actions and rules in a 
way which is consistent with the universal law that governs the whole cosmos, 
thus bringing humans nearer to their creator. Therefore, it was not until the 
transition to modernity — with the paradigmatic revolution, in the theories 
of order, from holism to individualism13 — that individual authority vested 
with public power openly claimed to aim at just pursuing its own interests, 
without any fear of thereby committing a kind of hubris against natural or 
divine law.14 The concept of sovereignty was one of the most significant 
effects of the epochal change of the dominant paradigm of social order that 
characterized the beginning of the Modern Ages.
While sovereignty is a concept that was created — or, at least, significantly 
re-conceptualized and decisively re-founded — at the dawn of modernity, 
individual property, to the contrary, was well-known also to the ancient and 
medieval world. Yet, before the Modern Ages it was often openly despised or, in 
8 thomas aquinas, summa theoloGica pt. II, sec. I, question 95, art. 2 (Christian 
Classics 1981) (1265-1273).
9 Id. question 93, art. 3.
10 Id. question 1.
11 Id. question 2.
12 dante aliGhieri, de monarchia bk. I, chs. IV, XI, XII (Utet 1986) (1310-1314) 
(translated to English in dante aliGhieri, monarchy (Prue Shaw trans., 1996)).
13 On the paradigms of social order and their revolutions, see serGio dellavalle, 
dalla comunità particolare all’ordine universale, vol. i: i paradiGmi storici 
[From the individual communities to universal order, vol. i: the historic 
paradiGms] 22 (2011).
14 niccolò machiavelli, il principe (Einaudi 1995) (1513) (translated to English 
in niccolò machiavelli, the prince (Rufus Goodwin trans., 2007)).
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the most favorable case, regarded as a necessary evil. Plato’s uncompromising 
proscription of private property in his vision of the perfect politeia is well-
known,15 and the anti-individualistic attitude that is connected with this 
interdiction has been regarded as the fundament of a prototypical conception 
of the illiberal state.16 Moreover, Plato strictly rejected the notion of importing 
nonessential goods and, in general, free trade — as the most evident expression 
of the freedom of the economic agent acting for his/her own advantage — in 
the name of the self-sufficiency of the polis.17 Adopting a less radical approach, 
Aristotle admitted some practical advantages of commerce,18 but condemned 
the purpose of profit.19 Indeed, in his political philosophy private property 
was generally accepted, but had to be limited to the amount that guarantees 
the means for a well-functioning household, while “retail trade,” insofar as it 
aims at accumulating wealth, “is justly censured.”20 In fact, in a world where 
the individual had to realize itself as a citizen or in the domain of speculation, 
the selfish pursuit of wealth and personal priorities was regarded as a moral 
failure and a threat to common values. 
The contempt towards economic activity with the sole intention of individual 
advantage was subsequently embraced in the Roman Republic, as attested to 
by Cicero who despised small-scale trade thought to be limited to the service of 
greedy selfishness, but accepted large-scale commerce which was considered 
to be an advantage for the redistribution of goods on a cosmopolitan scale.21 
We can see here a dim glimmer of the revaluation of commerce which took 
place in the Hellenistic world, going on to influence the understanding of 
trade during the Roman Empire. This conception, known as the “doctrine of 
universal economy,” assessed the activity of trade downright positively, but 
only insofar as it contributes to the reestablishment of a worldwide homeostasis 
endangered by the unequal distribution of resources, and not because it might 
favor the accumulation of resources at the disposal of individual preferences.22 
Anyway, even this cautious reassessment of free economic activity was 
15 plato, supra note 5, bk. V, 464b et seq.
16 Karl popper, the open society and its enemies 1 (5th ed. 1995) (originally 
published in 1945).
17 plato, nomoi — laWs bk. VIII, 847b et seq. (1926).
18 aristoteles, politics, supra note 6, bk. VII, ch. 5, 1327a (1967).
19 Id. bk. VII, ch. 6, 1327a.
20 Id. bk. I, ch. 10, 1258b.
21 marcus tullius cicero, de oFFiciis bk. I, ch. 42, no. 151 (1913).
22 douGlas a. irWin, aGainst the tide 15 (1996); Armin von Bogdandy & Sergio 
Dellavalle, The Lex Mercatoria of Systems Theory: Localisation, Reconstruction 
and Criticism from a Public Law Perspective, 4 transnat’l leGal theory 59, 
62 (2013).
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short-lived: as Christendom became the dominant religion of the Western 
world, the condemnation of commerce and the marginalization of the social 
significance of private property were reaffirmed in a no less severe and radical 
form than in antiquity.23 
Against the religious background that dominated the Middle Ages, in which 
human beings had to strive for eternity, the significance conceded to private 
property could not but be marginal. It was once again Aquinas who expressed 
with the highest systematic clarity the attitude shared by his contemporaries: 
private property has to be recognized as a necessary social and legal institution,24 
but only if it serves to consolidate and guarantee the status of the possessor 
within a static understanding of society as a predetermined holon.25 It is 
almost superfluous to say that this is precisely the opposite of the conception 
that locates the social meaning of private property in its capacity to improve 
the social condition of individuals or to implement personal preferences 
according to a dynamic conception of social interaction. Only with the shift 
to the Modern Ages was individual property eventually acknowledged as an 
essential instrument for the self-realization of those who are endowed with it.26 
To sum up, both the idea that the main purpose of the public power should 
consist in defending the individuality of the community, as well as the conviction 
that private property is an essential value to be protected because it makes the 
self-realization of individuals possible, were largely unknown in antiquity and 
in the Middle Ages. It was with the paradigmatic turn to individualism, and 
thus with the assertion that the individual cannot be reduced to the primacy 
of the whole, that sovereignty became the champion of the defense of the 
principle of individuality in the public sphere, while the protection of private 
property took on the same task in the private dimension. Being offspring 
of the same intellectual attitude, sovereignty and property were destined to 
merge and collide. The following Parts deal with the different ways in which 
this happened.
II. SovereIgnty aS ProPerty
I assume — as a presupposition of the analysis — that sovereignty is given 
when a public power is autonomous, while property consists of the possession 
23 irWin, supra note 22, at 17.
24 aquinas, supra note 8, pt. II, sec. II, question 66, art. 2. 
25 Id. question 32, art. 6.
26 irWin, supra note 22, at 21; huGo Grotius, de Jure belli ac pacis bk. II, ch. 2 
(William S. Hein & Co. 1995) (1646).
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of resources by private agents in order to realize their priorities.27 On this 
basis, the first pattern of the interconnection of the two concepts — which I 
propose to call “sovereignty as property” — refers to the situation in which 
self-reliant public power is supposed to serve mainly, if not exclusively, the 
private purposes of some members of the political community. By doing so, 
sovereign power necessarily gives up its originally distinctive publicness, since 
a power can only be genuinely public if it expresses the common interests 
and values that all members of the political community have reflexively 
contributed, at least potentially, to elaborate. We can identify three variants 
of the pattern of “sovereignty going private”: the political (A); the nationalist 
(B); and the technocratic (C).
A. Political Sovereignty
The first way in which the sovereign colonizes property by seizing the civil 
society to his/her own advantage can be defined as specifically political insofar 
as sovereignty is essentially regarded as an act of will by the public power. In 
this sense, the ineludible feature, here, is the capacity to take political decisions, 
and not the assumption of a pre-political belonging, as in the second variant, 
or the assumption of a superior knowledge as in the third. 
This understanding is the most ancient and goes as far back as to Jean 
Bodin as the very framer of the modern concept of sovereignty. According 
to Bodin’s groundbreaking definition, the public power — or “power vested 
in a commonwealth (république)”28 — is sovereign insofar as it is “absolute 
and perpetual.”29 The perpetuity of power means that a political agent can be 
regarded as a sovereign only if the exercise of its prerogatives has no time 
limit. In other words, an elected magistrate cannot be seen as a “sovereign”: in 
fact, a true “sovereign” has to be forever “sovereign,” and not just for a while. 
However, more important in the context of the present analysis is the second 
essential feature of sovereignty, i.e., its absoluteness. This attribute refers to 
the circumstance that truly sovereign power has to be self-reliant and must not 
obey any rule coming from outside. Precisely in this claim lies the contribution 
that the concept of sovereignty has made to the development of an idea of 
public power more related to the defense of the interests of the single polity 
27 See Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, The Human Right to Private Property, 
18 theoretical inquiries l. 391 (2017).
28 Jean bodin, six livres de la république 85 (Imprimerie de Jean de Tournes 
1579) (translated to English in Jean bodin, six booKs oF the commonWealth, 
bk. I, ch. VIII (M.J. Tooley trans., 1955)).
29 Id.
2017] Dialectics of Sovereignty and Property  277
as an individual entity. Before the postulation of sovereignty, public power 
had to locate its actions within the broader context of a worldwide order so 
that it had to validate its decisions as consistent with the task of maintaining 
a stable and well-balanced political structure, in antiquity, or with the aim of 
implementing the divine law in the theology of the Middle Ages. Sovereign 
public power, to the contrary, needs a merely self-referential justification, i.e., 
it is required only to defend its actions by reference to the protection of its 
own — indeed individual and often openly selfish — interests and priorities.
Bodin did not pass over the boundaries that natural or divine law may 
impose on the exercise of sovereign power in silence. In fact, he explicitly 
concedes that sovereign power has to be regarded as limited by the commands 
of God and nature.30 Nonetheless, in Bodin’s understanding such a limitation 
is eventually rather irrelevant: indeed, the holder of sovereign authority, 
being nothing less than the secular imago of the almighty God, has the 
right to interpret freely, i.e., without any secular or ecclesiastic control, the 
norms deriving from natural or divine law. Furthermore, no effective remedy 
against violation is provided. Put in the hands of a sovereign power, political 
decisions will aim only at fostering the advantages of the single polity. The 
explicit selfishness of the traditional conception of sovereignty31 has been 
condemned — with some good reasons — as being incompatible with the 
core idea of international law and order,32 as well as a powerful instrument 
for imperialistic purposes.33
Given Bodin’s absolute conception of sovereignty, the problem arises as 
to why it should be considered subordinate to a privatistic understanding of 
power, thereby eluding the very essence of the public political dimension. To 
understand this aspect, it is necessary to address a further question, concerning 
who should be considered the holder of sovereign prerogatives in Bodin’s 
view. The answer can be found in how he re-proposes the Aristotelian theory 
of the familistic origin of the commonwealth.34 According to this conception, 
the political community is assumed to originate not only genetically but also 
30 Id. at 91 et seq. (in the English version: bk. I, ch. VIII).
31 As already mentioned above, the “traditional” understanding of sovereignty 
is no conceptual necessity, but only an option. Indeed, “sovereignty” can also 
be interpreted — with some significant theoretical adjustments — in a post-
traditional and non-egoistic way. See, for more details, Dellavalle, supra note 
2, and infra Part IV.
32 heinrich Kipp, völKerordnunG und völKerrecht im mittelater [the order 
oF the peoples and the Jus Gentium in the middle aGes] 124 (1950).
33 hans Kelsen, reine rechtslehre 153 (1934) (translated to English in hans 
Kelsen, pure theory oF laW (Max Knight trans., 1967)).
34 bodin, supra note 28, at 1 (in the English version: bk. I, ch. I).
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— which is even more important — conceptually from an association of 
families. Therefore, since the family “is not only the true source and origin 
of the commonwealth, but also its principal constituent,”35 the organizational 
structure of the family serves as a model also for the political community 
as a whole. As a result, just as the authority in the family — at least in the 
male-centered organization of the family that Bodin had in mind — belongs 
to the patriarch, in the same way the power in the commonwealth has to be 
bestowed on the head of the state, more precisely on the monarch. 
Yet — we may object — the monarch is nothing but an individual himself, 
with very specific and personal priorities, which are likely to be imposed, due 
to his unfettered power, on the decisions concerning the whole community. 
Nevertheless, this risk of an immediate identification of the personal interests 
of a single person with the resolutions regarding the community as a whole 
— thus reducing public sovereignty to private property — could be prevented 
through two different institutional precautions. First, it is true indeed that 
the monarch is presumed to exercise a public function, so that he should be 
seen as something essentially distinct from a private person. However, the 
publicness of the role played by the monarch can be guaranteed only through 
a mediation between his actions and the will of his subjects — a mediation 
which should be brought into effect by powerful Estates. This is precisely 
not the case in Bodin’s vision of the absolutistic state: in his conception, in 
fact, the Estates are strictly subordinates to the prince, not being provided 
with any control competence,36 so that the prince is lastly not bound by the 
law (legibus solutus).37 
Nonetheless, if the public control that should prevent a problematic 
identification of the preferences of the monarch with the advantage of the 
community is lacking, a second, rather private, strategy could be applied. This 
would consist in preserving a private domain, based on individual property 
and well-secured against abuses by the crown. Indeed, Bodin explicitly claims 
that “the prince cannot take his subjects’ property without just and reasonable 
cause,” unless he breaks the laws of God and of nature,38 and that the respect 
for liberty and property of the subjects distinguishes the just prince from the 
tyrant.39 However, he also adds that “natural reason instructs us that the public 
good must be preferred to the particular, and that subjects should give up not 
only their mutual antagonisms and animosities, but also their possessions, for 
35 Id. at 7 (in the English version: bk. I, ch. II).
36 Id. at 98 et seq. (in the English version: bk. I, ch. VIII).
37 Id. at 92 (in the English version: bk. I, ch. VIII).
38 Id. at 109 (in the English version: bk. I, ch. VIII).
39 Id. at 190 (in the English version: bk. II, ch. II).
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the safety of the commonwealth.”40 Furthermore, he maintains that “every 
citizen is a subject since his liberty is limited by the sovereign power to which 
he owes obedience,”41 whereas — once again — no institution representing the 
interests of the citizens (or, rather, of the subjects) and vested with sufficient 
competencies is established. Put in the hands of a sovereign power lacking 
effective control, the protection of liberty and property of the citizens is lastly 
at the mercy of the arbitrary will of the monarch.
Three elements characterize Bodin’s theory of sovereignty and its risk of 
degenerating into the mere defense of private interests. First, the highest principle 
of political life is not located in the rights and interests of the citizens, but in 
the benefit to the community understood as a whole. Second, the advantage 
of the head of state is presumed to be identical to the wellbeing of the whole 
community. In this sense, Bodin’s concept of sovereignty is in the service of 
an essentially private interest insofar as it is shaped according to a familistic 
presupposition: in fact, the sovereign is here the monarch who governs his 
political community in the same way in which a father rules his family. Third, 
no powerful institution is entrusted with the task of protecting the rights of 
the citizens — or, rather, of the subjects — against possible abuses by the 
monarch. Given these premises, the sovereign might easily promote his own 
personal priorities, presenting them as a general advantage and transforming 
sovereignty into a means in support of dynastic priorities, quite detached from 
an effectively inclusive understanding of the common good.
Some aspects of Bodin’s way of “privatizing sovereignty” surely belong 
to the past, at least in the Western world. This holds, in particular, in regard to 
his dynastic understanding of sovereignty. However, other elements — which 
constitute the core of political sovereignty — have far from vanished from 
the horizon of political theory. In particular, the idea that sovereignty consists 
in the exercise of authority by the public power, whereas little attention is 
dedicated to the source of authority and its legitimation, still remains one of the 
most influential interpretations of the concept.42 Against this background, the 
sovereign power transforms the resources of the civil society into instruments 
for the exclusive achievement of its goals. Moreover, since the procedures for 
the inclusion of the stakeholders seem to be considered rather marginal, the 
sovereign power is at risk of being controlled by an elite which is disconnected 
from the broader aspirations of the members of the society. As a consequence, 
sovereignty loses its publicness and its justification as one of the bulwarks of 
40 Id. at 92 (in the English version: bk. I, ch. VIII).
41 Id. at 48 (in the English version: bk. I, ch. VI).
42 See, e.g., martin louGhlin, Foundations oF public laW (2010).
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the common good. Sovereignty and property merge — both thereby losing 
a great deal of their meaning and functions.
B. Nationalist Sovereignty
At the dawn of the nineteenth century, the crisis of the dynastic conception 
of sovereignty brought about a redefinition of the notion in order to include 
a more active participation of the governed. As a result, political sovereignty 
gave way to popular sovereignty. It was the Déclaration des Droit de l’Homme 
et du Citoyen of 1789 (Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen) 
that in Article 3 stated, laying down a milestone on the way to the abolition of 
tyranny in Europe, that “the principle of any sovereignty resides essentially in 
the nation.”43 On this basis, however, the question was then how the concept 
of “nation” should be interpreted. According to the understanding expressed in 
the French Déclaration, the “nation” is the community of citizens, empowered 
through the establishment of their representative assembly and thus guaranteeing 
that the sovereignty that is bestowed upon it preserves a true publicness. 
Yet this is not the only way in which the “nation” was conceived of. Indeed, 
a second interpretation was developed in the context of German political 
romanticism,44 soon spreading all over the Western world and even beyond. 
In this second meaning, the “nation” is regarded not as an association of 
individuals — every one of them with his/her own preferences to be mediated 
through procedures in order to work out a shared idea of the common good 
— but as something unitary, a single “people” or Volk, characterized by a 
strong and unique identity.45 This identity, furthermore, is not seen as the result 
of social processes of reflexive communication, but as something based in 
pre-rational collective experiences of ethnic belonging.46 Thus, the nation is 
perceived as a reality which is no less immediate than the single person — 
and almost as natural. As a result, according to its ethnic understanding, the 
nation is essentially conceived of as an individual itself. 
43 Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen 1789, art. 3, leGiFrance, 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/Droit-francais/Constitution/Declaration-des-
Droits-de-l-Homme-et-du-Citoyen-de-1789 (last visited Mar. 20, 2017) (“Le 
principe de toute souveraineté réside essentiellement dans la nation.”). For 
English translation, see Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 
WiKipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Declaration_of_the_Rights_of_Man_
and_of_the_Citizen (last modified Mar. 20, 2017).
44 adam h. müller, die elemente der staatsKunst [elements oF statecraFt] 
(Fischer 1922) (1809).
45 anthony d. smith, national identity 1 (1991).
46 Id. at 19.
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The conception of the nation — or rather of the Volk — as an exclusive 
entity characterized by the tendency to pursue its own interests and to defend 
its specific identity has found its way also into constitutional adjudication.47 
Remarkable examples of the influence of nationalistic thinking on constitutional 
discourse can be found in two statements issued by the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), generally known as the 
Maastricht Urteil of October 12, 199348 and the Lissabon Urteil of June 30, 
2009,49 as well as in a declaration of the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional of 
December 13, 2004.50 More specifically, the Tribunal Constitucional claimed 
in its declaration that the transfer of competences to supranational institutions 
could only be acceptable if the law on which such institutions are based is 
compatible with the fundamental principles of the domestic legal order. 
In principle, this would not raise any problem from the point of view of a 
postnational concept of sovereignty if the Court had not added the reference 
to “material limits” (limites materiales) to the conferral of competences 
upon supranational organizations. In the interpretation of the Court, these 
“limits” are given by “the respect for the sovereignty of the State, or our 
basic constitutional structures and of the system of fundamental principles 
and values set forth in our Constitution, where the fundamental rights acquire 
their own substantive nature.”51 Through the juxtaposition of the protection of 
fundamental rights with state sovereignty — wrongly presented as self-evident 
— the Tribunal Constitucional ruled out the possibility that a multilayered 
system of shared sovereignty could take on the same level of safeguarding 
rights and values. Therefore, the only constitutional system that properly 
protects the most essential conditions of social life is assumed to be the one 
based on the sovereignty of the nation-state. 
The two abovementioned statements of the Bundesverfassungsgericht go in 
the same direction, although with a much more radical attitude.52 In the statement 
47 Sergio Dellavalle, Lost in Transition? From Domestic Integration Through National 
Constitutions to Supranational Integration Through European Constitutionalism, 
in the constitutional inteGrity oF the european union 89, 107 (Fabian 
Amtenbrink & Peter A.J. van den Berg eds., 2010).
48 12 bverFGe 89, 155 (Ger.).
49 48 bverFGE 497 (Ger.).
50 Declaracion de 13 de diciembre de 2004, tribunal constitucional (Mar. 4, 
2005), http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2005/01/04/pdfs/T00005-00021.pdf.
51 Id. § II.2.
52 In general, however, the jurisprudence of the Bundesverfassungsgericht as 
regards the defense of national sovereignty against the transfer of competences 
to supranational institutions is rather vacillating. For an analysis, see Dellavalle, 
supra note 47, at 110 et seq.
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of 1993, the Court asserted that the nation-state shall maintain its sovereignty53 
in order to guarantee democratic legitimacy. By contrast, a supranational 
democracy will never be really possible inasmuch as, from the point of view laid 
down extensively in the statement, democracy always depends on the existence 
of “pre-juridical preconditions.”54 In plain language, this is nothing other than 
the “relative spiritual, social, and political homogeneity” of the “state people” 
(Staatsvolk).55 A substantial, pre-juridical as well as a pre-political identity of 
the Volk — not primarily the deliberative processes involving the citizens and 
the rules laid down to make interaction peaceful and cooperative — is seen, 
thus, as the condition for democratic legitimacy and social integration. For 
that reason, supranational integration and multilevel constitutionalism shall 
never go so far as to threaten national identity and sovereignty. The approach 
expressed in the statement on the Maastricht Treaty was reiterated, then, in 
the statement of 2009, concerning the constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty. 
The explicit target of the criticism, here, is the European Parliament which — 
in the words of the Court — “is not a body of representation of a sovereign 
European people.”56 The main reason is that a “true” parliament should be 
the expression of the self-determination of a people (Volk),57 organized in the 
form of a “sovereign statehood” (souveräne Staatlichkeit).58 The conclusion is 
that democratic legitimacy only exists in the nation-state, and the nation-state 
can only survive if it maintains its exclusive sovereignty. Or, from a different 
standpoint, sovereignty does not essentially depend on the participation by 
the citizens, but rather on the existence of a pre-political national identity.
We have here the second variant of the pattern of “sovereignty as property.” In 
the nationalistic variant of sovereignty, the actor characterized by particularistic 
interests is not the monarch or a detached political elite, but a collective super-
individual, a megaanthropos which nonetheless is no less prone than the prince 
or the self-reliant holders of political power to transforming the public sphere 
into an arena of exclusively egoistic self-realization. As a manifestation of the 
particularistic will of an individual nation, sovereignty is still subject to the 
selfish preferences which are generally accorded to the single actor. Surely, 
the publicness of sovereignty seems to be more convincing in this second 
variant of sovereignty going private, since the decisions of the sovereign 
53 12 bverFGe 89, 103, 155 (Ger.).
54 Dellavalle, supra note 47, at 98.
55 Id. at 101.
56 48 bverFGE 497 (Ger.).
57 Dellavalle, supra note 47, at 268.
58 Id. at 216.
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power are thought to be bound by the interest of the people. Nevertheless, 
this impression may turn out to be rather wrong for at least two reasons. 
The first reason is that the assumption that the people itself has to be 
conceived of as an individuality simply ignores the fact that every social reality 
— and therefore also the “people” — is not an organic unity, but a sum of 
individuals and social groups with different interests and values.59 In this sense, 
the idea of the “nation” is the result of a political project60 and the concept of 
a unitary “people” is nothing but a juridical fiction.61 As a consequence, every 
presupposition of social unity always runs the risk of constraining plurality and 
the discourse that has to develop between individuals and groups. Only such a 
discourse can help to achieve a consensus or at least a compromise which — 
far from being assumed from the outset — cannot but be the result of dialogue 
and sometimes also of democratically formalized conflicts. Furthermore, the 
idea of the organic unity of the “people” may come together with the presence 
of elites, characterized by a rather weak democratic legitimacy but a strong 
charismatic authority, which might be tempted to use their power for their 
own advantage.62 Under these conditions, the alleged publicness of popular 
sovereignty unveils a core that is no less private and irreflexive than in any 
other elitist tradition, be it dynastic, technocratic, or simply political. 
The second reason why the concept of popular sovereignty within the 
borders of a single nation has to be seen as rather incomplete refers to the plural 
status of individuals. Indeed, if we admit that individuals are not only citizens 
of a single polity but also members of the whole community of humankind, 
then also the public power of the individual political community has to 
justify its legitimacy on both levels: the parochial dimension in the service 
of its citizens, and the cosmopolitan with reference to the justified claims of 
noncitizens. In other words, a sovereign power accomplishes its public task 
and is therefore properly legitimate only if it takes into account not only 
the democratic input and the interests of its citizens but also the reasonable 
59 For an interpretation of the “nation” not as a unity with a predetermined identity, 
but as the result of historical processes, mostly driven by social and intellectual 
elites, see ernest Gellner, nations and nationalism (1983); liah GreenFeld, 
nationalism: Five roads to modernity (1992); and eric J. hobsbaWm, nation 
and nationalism since 1780 (1990).
60 For the opposite interpretation, see Joseph M. Whitmeyer, Elites and Popular 
Nationalism, 53 brit. J. soc. 321 (2002).
61 hans Kelsen, vom Wesen und Wert der demoKratie [on the essence and 
value oF democracy] 15 et seq. (1929).
62 norbert elias, studien über die deutschen 199 (4th ed. 1990) (originally 
published in 1989) (translated to English in norbert elias, the Germans (Eric 
Dunning & Stephen Mennell trans., 1996)).
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requests of noncitizens, insofar as they are affected by its decisions. On the 
basis of this understanding, the sovereign power that shuts the door against 
aliens betrays a significant aspect of its obligation to publicness. In fact, if 
the privatization of sovereignty consists in using it just for selfish purposes, 
then also the attitude of a sovereign nation that refuses any responsibility 
towards what happens beyond its borders cannot but be considered a form of 
an unsatisfactory merging of the two concepts of sovereignty and property.
C. Technocratic Sovereignty
The third variant of “sovereignty as property” has developed rather recently and 
is related to the creation and rapid increase of networks of global governance.63 
In particular, it is related to executive, expertise-based international organizations64 
— strictly connected with a further expanding phenomenon, namely global 
administrative law65 — as well as to international judicial institutions.66 The first 
problem that has to be addressed by analyzing the third variant of “sovereignty 
as property” is whether we can properly speak of “sovereignty” as regards the 
post-traditional exercise of public authority. Indeed, power is implemented here, 
as regards both the procedures to take decisions as well as their enforcement, 
in a quite different way than in the first two variants of the pattern. However, 
against the background of the postnational constellation, sovereignty need not 
be understood as exclusive any longer: resorting to a more flexible and up-
to-date conception, it can be defined as the effective exercise of public power 
over a particular population and regarding a certain kind of social interaction.67 
On the basis of this redefinition, sovereign power can overcome the original 
understanding as a monad and be reconceived as a network. Furthermore — and 
again within the postnational horizon — public power does not need to rely 
only on “hard” means of enforcement in order to be effective. To the contrary, 
public authorities are not only deeply interconnected but also undoubtedly 
capable of realizing their tasks by resorting largely or even uniquely to “soft” 
instruments. Thus, on the basis of the ineludible updating of the concept of 
63 anne-marie slauGhter, a neW World order (2004).
64 the exercise oF public authority by international institutions (Armin Von 
Bogdandy et al. eds., 2009) (largely pre-published in Symposium, The Exercise 
of Public Authority by International Institutions, 9 German l.J. 1375 (2008)).
65 Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Robert Steward, The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law, 68 laW & contemp. probs. 15 (2005).
66 armin von boGdandy & inGo venzKe, international Judicial laWmaKinG 
(2012).
67 See Dellavalle, supra note 2.
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sovereignty, the power exercised by international public authorities has to be 
regarded, in fact, as a contemporary expression of “sovereignty.” 
In contrast to the increasing number of fields of application of international 
public authority and its no less growing effects, its legitimacy remains rather 
shaky.68 Many attempts have been made to overcome the deficit. None, 
however, is really satisfying. Some of them seem simply to miss the point 
that makes democratic legitimacy special and particularly valuable. One of 
the strategies that aim at justifying the legitimacy of technocratic decision-
making is, for instance, the reduction of legitimacy to legality or to judicial 
control.69 However, legitimacy is thus deprived of its most relevant feature, 
at least if we assume a democratic standpoint. Indeed, the conditions for 
a norm or a decision to be regarded as legitimate cannot only be that they 
are issued on the basis of generally recognized procedural rules and that 
they can be submitted to judicial scrutiny. A further element is ineludible 
from the democratic perspective, namely that norms and decisions are the 
outcome of the reflexive participation of the citizens, so that the procedural and 
judicial framework has its fundamental raison d’être in guaranteeing that the 
participation of the citizens is fair and inclusive. The same shortcoming can 
also be observed as regards other strategies for the legitimation of technocratic 
rule. Among these, an outstanding position is taken by the theory of the 
“output-legitimacy,”70 according to which an institutional framework and its 
decisions are to be considered legitimate if they produce social conditions 
that the populace tacitly accepts as generally advantageous. The most recent 
variant of this theory goes as far as to speak of an “administrative legitimacy” 
as a distinctive feature of the European Union.71 
What all these attempts to provide a legitimation for technocratic governance 
are missing is the recognition that legitimacy, to be qualified as democratic, 
requires participation. This point was — and is — well known to all the most 
significant thinkers and politicians who, over the centuries, have been — and 
are — influential advocates of the democratic organization of the polity. From 
Pericles’s speech during the Peloponnesian War72 to Kant’s outlining of the 
68 The deficit does not concern only the executive branch of international public 
authority, but also its judicial dimension. See armin von boGdandy & inGo 
venzKe, in Whose name? (2014).
69 Rüdiger Wolfrum, Legitimacy of International Law and the Exercise of 
Administrative Functions, 9 German l.J. 2039 (2008).
70 See, e.g., Fritz W. scharpF, GoverninG in europe: eFFective and democratic? 
(1999).
71 Peter L. Lindseth, Equilibrium, Demoi-cracy, and Delegation in the Crisis of 
European Integration, 15 German l.J. 529 (2014).
72 thucydides, supra note 7, bk. II, para. 35 et seq. (see especially para. 37).
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principle of volenti non fit iniuria;73 from Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address74 to 
the most recent formulations of a theory of deliberative democracy,75 the idea 
of democratic legitimacy has always been that, in principle, no one knows 
better than the citizens themselves what suits them best. Some rulers may have 
more knowledge or skills than the average citizen. Yet without the control 
coming from the civil society, reflexively expressed through democratic 
procedures of participation, such knowledge and skills, as well as the power 
that pretends to be justified by them, can easily be used to the benefit of those 
in charge. The question may take on new nuances in times characterized by 
the spread of social networks, the uncontrolled dissemination of fake news 
and the oblivion of fact-checking. Surely, the unprecedented situation — at 
least since the beginning of modernity — should lead to more reflections 
on the essence of participation, on what its conditions are and on how they 
can be safeguarded. However, the conclusion that unfettered technocratic 
governance will yield a better outcome is far from self-evident. Actually, 
who could guarantee — also under these new circumstances — that the elites 
are working for the citizens, if not the scrutiny by the citizens themselves? 
Some supporters of technocratic governance show some sensibility for the 
necessity of a proper involvement of the ruled. Their proposals range from 
requesting more transparency for the expertise-based decision-making-processes 
and more deliberative inclusion of the stakeholders,76 to a communicative 
reformulation of a participatory exercise of international public authority based 
on discourse theory.77 However, without clearly formulated and compelling 
73 immanuel Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, in viii WerKausGabe, § 46, at 
432 (Suhrkamp 1977) (1797) (translated to English in immanuel Kant, the 
metaphysics oF morals (Mary Gregor trans., 1996)). As regards Kant, it must 
be specified that he was not — at least not in his wording — an advocate of 
democracy, but rather of republicanism. However, his understanding of the 
“republic” is largely identical with our concept of democracy since this includes, 
in contrast to the ancient or Rousseauian ideas of democracy, the principle of 
the division of powers.
74 Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), https://www.
abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/gettysburg.htm.
75 amy Gutmann & dennis F. thompson, Why deliberative democracy? (2004); 
JürGen habermas, FaKtizität und GeltunG. beiträGe zur disKurstheorie des 
rechts und des demoKratischen rechtsstaats (1992) (translated to English in 
JürGen habermas, betWeen Facts and norms (William Rehg trans., 1996)); 
carlos nino, the constitution oF deliberative democracy (1996).
76 slauGhter, supra note 63, at 231 et seq.
77 matthias Goldmann, internationale öFFentliche GeWalt [international public 
authority] 245 (2015).
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rules that guarantee real inclusion and a sufficient neutralization of social 
and economic power within the decision-making-process — conditions that 
characterize the proper exercise of democracy — even promising proposals 
are destined to remain impaired. The task of democratic legitimacy consists 
in creating a sphere, neutralized as far as possible with regard to social 
and economic power, in which all citizens — or, in the most wide-ranging 
understanding, all those concerned, including noncitizens — deliberate in order 
to specify shared interests and the way to meet common questions. If these 
conditions are not fulfilled, the decision-making process risks degenerating 
— also due to the deepening of social and economic inequality78 — into 
an instrument for defending the benefit of the most powerful. Under such 
circumstances, the governance institutions of the transnational domain are 
doomed to be reduced to a technocracy at the service of self-reproducing elites,79 
and sovereignty, also in this most updated variant, again sees its publicness 
fading away and being replaced by the private selfishness of the few.
III. ProPerty aS SovereIgnty
The second pattern of the dialectics of sovereignty and property refers to 
those authors who claim absoluteness for the system of private property. In 
this view, private property is not the instrument for the self-realization of 
single individuals, who have then to establish the public dimension of shared 
issues characterized by inclusive participation and deliberation. Rather, it is 
transformed into a self-reliant sphere that purports to be sovereign insofar as 
no public instance is accepted as located above it. 
In the theoretical panorama, the absolutization of the system of private 
property is a relatively new phenomenon. Traditionally, indeed, it had been 
prevented — even in the theories most prone to recognizing the positive role 
of private property — by the unchallenged presence of at least one of two 
different assumptions, both maintaining, though in quite separate forms, the 
superiority of the public sphere. The first assumption is that the protection 
of private property and free trade is justified, lastly, as an instrument for the 
increase of the wealth of the nation, therefore by an explicitly public interest. 
The second assumption maintains, instead, that the legal system of property, 
78 thomas piKetty, capital in the 21st century (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2014).
79 JürGen habermas, im soG der technoKratie 82 et seq. (2013) (translated to 
English in JürGen habermas, the lure oF technocracy (Ciarin Cronin trans., 
2015)); WolFGanG streecK, buyinG time: the delayed crisis oF democratic 
capitalism (2014).
288 Theoretical Inquiries in Law [Vol. 18:269
as part of private law, can only be validated by the intervention of public 
power and through its legal means. 
The first kind of limitation of the system of private property characterizes 
the attitude of all the — mainly British — authors who supported the theory of 
free trade between the second half of the eighteenth century and the first half 
of the nineteenth century. The most significant example is the very framer of 
the theory of free trade, namely Adam Smith. At first glance, Smith seems to 
plea for a reversal of the traditional hierarchy between the public and private 
domains. In his understanding, indeed, it was not the economic failure of private 
actors but the inefficiency and wastefulness of public administrations that 
impoverished nations. The best guarantee for growth and prosperity, therefore, 
is not provided by the activities of the public sector but by “the uniform, 
constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his condition.”80 
For the first time the pursuit of self-interest by individuals, based on private 
property and leading to its further accumulation, was considered the condition 
for the wealth of the whole society. Despite the indisputable novelty of this 
theory, when it comes to specify the “last end” of social life, Smith’s vision 
features an unexpected turnaround. Indeed, according to Smith the main 
goal of the pursuit of private interests is not private, but collective welfare. 
Furthermore, welfare is not understood in global terms but from the perspective 
of the primacy of the nation.81 As a result, even in the view of the first and 
most committed partisan of free trade, individual interest and private property 
have to cede priority to the public dimension consisting of the wellbeing of 
the national community. In doing so, Smith maintains and guarantees the 
independence of political sovereignty from private property. Far from being 
an exception, his moderate restoration of public priority after initially shaking 
the traditional hierarchy between public and private expresses the prevailing 
view among the economists who supported free trade across the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries.82
While according to Smith and the economists who shared his view the 
reaffirmation of the supremacy of the dimension of public interest has prevalently 
an ethical and political character, the other way to prevent the private self-
reliance based on property from any aspiration to absoluteness and, thus, to 
80 adam smith, an inquiry into the nature and causes oF the Wealth oF nations 
bk. II, ch. III (Pickering 1995) (1776).
81 adam smith, the theory oF moral sentiments bk. VI, ch. II, para. 29 (Millar 
1790) (1759).
82 See John stuart mill, principles oF political economy bk. III, ch. 17, para. 
13 et seq. (Green & Co. 1909) (1848); david ricardo, on the principles oF 
political economy and taxation 89 (Batoche Books 2001) (1817).
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sovereignty resorts to doctrinal considerations concerning the structure of the 
legal system and the relations between its parts. In his seminal work, System des 
heutigen Römischen Rechts — one of the foundational texts of the doctrine of 
continental civil law — Friedrich Carl von Savigny laid down the systematic 
reasons why private law cannot be regarded as self-sufficient.83 Although his 
interest was concentrated mainly on private law, so that he surely cannot be 
suspected of partisanship in favor of public law, nonetheless he maintained that 
private law cannot be founded only on itself, but always needs the fundamental 
support of public law and authority.84 Besides the consideration that private 
law shall always find its deeper sense within the context of the higher interest 
of the Volk85 — which is, so to speak, a völkisch version of the same argument 
that we have already seen developed in Smith’s texts — according to Savigny 
private law depends on public law for three specifically juridical functions 
which it cannot accomplish in itself. The first is the nomopoesis: private law 
is created through public law procedures.86 The second is the establishment 
of civil law procedures against the fortuity of interactions between private 
actors.87 The third, lastly, is the establishment of criminal law to punish the 
breach of private agreements when this is assumed to have consequences for 
the legal order of the whole community.88 The consequence that we can draw 
from these limitations of private law — and thus also of the law of private 
property — presented by Savigny is that private law cannot autonomously 
validate itself: for private law to be valid and effective, therefore, a solid 
public law system must be established above it.
The recent private law theory — at least in its more uncompromising 
approaches — has developed a conception of the independence of private law 
which rejects both abovementioned constraints: Smith’s ethical reservation as 
well as Savigny’s systematic-doctrinal restraint. The conceptual organon that 
has made this radicalization possible has been delivered mainly by systems 
theory, and secondarily by postmodernism. The contribution of systems theory 
consists, first, in the assumption that no supra-systemic rationality can be detected 
by the observer while analyzing social interactions, or displayed by the agent 
83 Friedrich carl von saviGny, system des heutiGen römischen rechts (1840) 
(translated to English in Friedrich carl von saviGny, system oF modern roman 
laW (William Holloway trans., 1979)).
84 We can find a similar argument, although from a rather philosophical point of 
view and surely from a more public law-centered perspective, also in the contract 
theory of state. See, e.g., Kant, supra note 73, at 365 § 8.
85 saviGny, supra note 83, bk. I, ch. 1, §§ 9, 21, 24.
86 Id. at 24.
87 Id. at 25.
88 Id. at 26.
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while acting in the context of such interactions.89 As a result, no subjective or 
intersubjective rationality and no lifeworld are assumed to exist beyond the 
functional rationalities of systems. Furthermore, social subsystems are regarded 
as being involved in a process of continuous globalization90 and differentiation,91 
while they maintain in their internal functioning an autopoietic modus operandi92 
which accounts for their “operative closeness” towards the world outside, 
or — as Niklas Luhmann calls it — against the “environment.”93 Lastly, law 
is defined as a subsystem for the stabilization of normative expectations.94 
As for its part, postmodern thinking has contributed by introducing a radical 
and, in this form, almost unprecedented skepticism regarding both the idea of 
universal reason95 and the project of a worldwide order based on the possibility 
of inclusive deliberative processes shaped by public law.96 
89 niKlas luhmann, die GesellschaFt der GesellschaFt 874 (1997) (translated to 
English in niKlas luhmann, theory oF society (Rhodes Barrett trans., 2012)).
90 Id. at 145; niKlas luhmann, das recht der GesellschaFt 572 (1993) (translated 
to English in niKlas luhmann, laW as a social system (Klaus A. Zeigert trans., 
2004)); Gunther Teubner, “Global Bukowina”: Legal Pluralism in the World 
Society, in Global laW Without a state 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
91 luhmann, supra note 89, at 78; Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, 
Fragmentierung des Weltrechts: Vernetzung globaler Regimes statt etatistischer 
Rechtseinheit [Fragmentation of the Global Legal System], in Weltstaat und 
WeltstaatlichKeit. beobachtunGen Globaler politischer struKturbildunG [World 
state and World statehood] 37 (Mathias Albert & Rudolf Stichweh eds., 2007).
92 luhmann, supra note 89, at 65 et seq., 92 et seq., 102 et seq.
93 Id. at 60 et seq.
94 luhmann, supra note 90, at 60 et seq., 125 et seq., 131, 143.
95 michel Foucault, histoire de la Folie à l’âGe classique (1961) (translated to 
English in michel Foucault, madness and civilization: a history oF insanity 
in the aGe oF reason (Richard Howard trans., 2006)); michel Foucault, les 
mots et les choses (1966) (translated to English in michel Foucault, the order 
oF thinGs (1970)); michel Foucault, l’ordre du discours (1971) (translated to 
English in michel Foucault, archaeoloGy oF KnoWledGe (Alan M. Sheridan 
trans., 2002)); michel Foucault, surveiller et punir (1975) (translated to 
English in michel Foucault, discipline and punish: the birth oF the prison 
(Alan M. Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 1977)); michel Foucault, histoire 
de la sexualité, i: la volonté de savoir (1976) (translated to English in michel 
Foucault, the history oF sexuality, volume i: the Will to KnoWledGe (Robert 
Hurley trans., 1978)); michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, in michel 
Foucault: beyond structuralism and hermeneutics 208 (H.L. Dreyfus & P. 
Rabinow eds., 1982).
96 Martti Koskenniemi, International Legislation Today: Limits and Possibilities, 
23 Wis. int’l l.J. 1 (2005).
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On the basis of these theoretical premises, contemporary private law theorists 
— in particular Gunther Teubner as the author who radicalized, probably more 
than anyone else, the approach in this field — have elaborated a conception 
of private law and of the legal system of globalized private property as an 
autopoietic legal regime. As far as the ethical and political priority of the 
public domain is concerned, as it was — and still is — present in almost the 
entire tradition of political philosophy and even in the work of many of the 
economists who plead for the centrality of private interests, the conception 
of private law influenced by systems theory rejects it not by proposing to 
turn the hierarchy between public and private upside down, but by stressing 
the independence of the two spheres.97 Since according to systems theory 
each subsystem operates according to its own specific rationality, with no 
relation of mutual interdependence or of hierarchy with other subsystems, the 
question is not whether the public domain shall be situated above or beneath 
the private dimension. Rather, the different subsystems are seen as coexistent 
beside one another, each of them perfectly self-sufficient and autonomous. 
Yet, even if we admit that systems theory has delivered the epistemological 
organon for a conception of society as made up of self-reliant subsystems 
with no suprasystemic subjective or intersubjective rationality — and some 
doubts may be justified as to whether this conception is really convincing98 
— nonetheless the problem remains as regards the self-validation of the 
system of private law and property. Teubner recognizes that the idea of a 
private law that derives its validity from the spontaneous interaction of its 
actors is difficult to justify. Nevertheless, the system of private law — he 
claims — has developed three specific strategies in order to validate itself 
autonomously.99 We have seen that the first problem of the self-validation of 
private law consists in the lack of an internal private-law set of norms with 
the aim of specifying the procedures for the production of secondary norms. 
Thus, to produce private law norms, the system of private law would have 
to resort to public law. The answer of the autonomous system of private 
law to this problem has been the establishment of an internal hierarchy 
of norms, i.e., a primary system of non-public-law-based and spontaneous 
norms as a legal basis for the generation of secondary norms. The second 
deficit of a presumably self-reliant system of private law is the apparent 
contingency and uniqueness of every single private law agreement between 
private agents which — according to the traditional doctrine — makes the 
intervention of public power necessary in order to guarantee predictable and 
97 Teubner, supra note 90.
98 Bogdandy & Dellavalle, supra note 22, at 78 et seq.
99 Teubner, supra note 90, at 16.
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consistent procedures. The reaction resorts in this case to what Teubner calls 
a “temporalization” of contingency. This means, concretely, that the single 
contract between private actors is superseded by iterated processes in which 
a standardization of rules occurs insofar as the contract both refers to the past 
and projects into the future. The third shortcoming is related to the system of 
private law’s presumed incapacity to enforce by itself the respect of its own 
rules, so that the public authority has to assist by establishing criminal law. 
The response, here, is externalization: the system of private law and property 
“externalizes the fatal self-validation of contract by referring conditions of 
validity and future conflicts to external ‘non-contractual’ institutions which 
are nevertheless ‘contractual,’ since they are a sheer internal product of the 
contract itself.”100 In other words, the private law system provides institutions 
with arbitration functions that monitor the validity and execution of norms. 
Although these institutions are created by means of private law, they overcome 
the spontaneous private law dimension because of their institutional nature.
Since in Teubner’s interpretation the system of private law and property does 
not recognize any higher authority, and given that, by definition, a power that 
autonomously enforces a self-sufficient set of rules is regarded as sovereign, 
the logical consequence, assuming these premises, cannot but be that the 
system of private law and property claims to be sovereign. This claim is even 
more reinforced by Teubner’s redefinition of the concept of “constitution.”101 
According to the usual understanding, the constitution is a set of norms that 
contains the fundamental rules of interaction within a community, thus giving 
legal form to its essential values and self-understanding. This specific public 
dimension of the concept of constitution is rejected by the radical private law 
theory represented by Teubner. The essential conceptual innovation consists 
in reducing the “constitution” merely to the set of norms that specify the 
procedures for the creation of secondary rules.102 Against this background, 
every legal subsystem with a two-level normative structure — i.e., with a 
set of primary norms and a second set of secondary norms, the legitimacy of 
which depends on whether they have been produced on the basis of the rules 
laid down in the primary set — would deserve to be called a “constitution.” 
A legal subsystem would be qualified as a “constitution,” therefore, regardless 
of whether this subsystem addresses questions of general and shared interests, 
100 Id.
101 Gunther teubner, constitutional FraGments (2012).
102 Gunther Teubner, Globale Zivilverfassungen: Alternativen zur staatszentrierten 
Verfassungstheorie [Global Civil Constitutions as Alternatives to the Statist 
Constitutional Theory], 63 zeitschriFt Für ausländisches öFFentliches recht 
und völKerrecht [J. comp. pub. l. & int’l l.] 1, 13 (2003).
2017] Dialectics of Sovereignty and Property  293
thus laying down the fundaments of social life, or refers only to the regulation 
of interactions between private agents in matters concerning primarily or 
exclusively their priorities. Because “constitutions” governing the interactions 
of private actors — or “global civil constitutions”103 — are supposed to be at 
the same level as public constitutions and no less self-sufficient or “sovereign” 
than them, the public domain is largely deprived of its traditional functions. 
First, it has no reason or authority to impose allegedly higher common interests 
on the system of private property. Second, also questions of justice104 and the 
discussion concerning the definition of shared issues are transferred from the 
political sphere of the public dimension to the subsystem-internal domain 
and rationality of private constitutions.105
Yet a self-reliant and therefore sovereign “constitutional” system, which 
is downgraded to a set of norms regulating the creation of secondary rules 
or, even more, to a merely “civil” dimension based on private law, loses 
the reference to what is actually constitutional sovereignty. Indeed, this is 
essentially connected to the legitimation generated by political representation 
as it is contained in the democratic processes laid down by constitutional law. 
Precisely this element accounts for the political character of the constitution 
as well as for its specific public quality. If the legal system of private property 
becomes sovereign, the public sphere, with its essential task of determining 
through inclusive, power-blind and democratic processes the common interests 
of the community, is doomed to wither away.
Iv. the Synergy of SovereIgnty and ProPerty
In both patterns analyzed in the former Parts, neither sovereignty nor property 
live up to their social functions: sovereignty loses its “public” dimension and 
property is not conceived of in a way that guarantees that every individual 
has the resources to shape his/her specific personality by pursuing his/her 
preferences insofar as this striving does not impair the chances for others 
to do the same. In order to overcome both deficiencies, some conceptual 
readjustments have to be introduced. In particular, all those involved by a 
specific public power should be regarded as equal in their right to realize their 
103 Id. at 6 et seq.
104 Gunther Teubner, Selbstsubversive Gerechtigkeit: Kontingenz-oder Transzendenz-
formel des Rechts? [Self-Overcoming Justice: Formula of Legal Contingencyor 
of Transcendence?], 29 zeitschriFt Für rechtssozioloGie [Ger. J.l. & soc’y] 
9 (2008).
105 Gunther Teubner, State Policies in Private Law? A Comment on Hanoch Dagan, 
56 am. J. comp. l. 835 (2008).
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priorities as well as in their capacity to take reasonable decisions concerning 
their present options and future destiny. This includes the citizens of a single 
political community, noncitizens insofar as they are involved by decisions 
taken by a political community, and all human beings from a cosmopolitan 
perspective. Furthermore, sovereign power cannot be seen simply as a “brute 
fact”; in order to be legitimate, it has to be understood as the result of the free 
and reflexive will of those who are obliged to respect its decisions.
These conceptual corrections, in fact, are anything but new in the history 
of Western political thought, since they were already introduced for the first 
time by the thinkers who, centuries ago, formulated the contract theory of state. 
Political contractualism is a further result of the paradigmatic revolution from 
holism to individualism that characterized the transition to the Modern Ages 
in Western culture106 and decisively contributed to the creation of the concept 
of sovereignty and to the rehabilitation of private property.107 The foundations 
of the contract theory of state were laid down by Thomas Hobbes in the 
middle of the seventeenth century,108 then taken up and adapted to different 
political preferences by some of the most outstanding Western philosophers 
of modern rationalism and enlightenment, including John Locke,109 Jean-
Jacques Rousseau110 and Immanuel Kant.111 Even the most recent revival of 
contractualism from a deliberative background112 as well as the communicative 
paradigm of political philosophy can be regarded as legitimate successors of 
modern contractualism, albeit with some reservations due to quite distinct 
epistemological premises.113 Starting from the central tenet of the priority 
106 dellavalle, supra note 13, at 184; Dellavalle, supra note 2, at 373.
107 See dellavalle, supra note 13.
108 thomas hobbes, de cive (Royston 1651) (1642) [hereinafter hobbes, de cive]; 
thomas hobbes, leviathan, or the matter, Form, and poWer oF a commonWealth 
ecclesiastical and civil (Crooke 1651) [hereinafter hobbes, leviathan].
109 John locKe, tWo treatises oF Government (Awnsham-Churchill 1690).
110 Jean-Jacques rousseau, du contract social, ou principes du droit politique 
(Garnier-Flammarion 1966) (1762) (translated to English in Jean-Jacques 
rousseau, the social contract (Maurice Cranston trans., 1968)).
111 immanuel Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf, in XI 
WerKausGabe 193, 203 (Suhrkamp 1977) (1795) (translated to English in 
immanuel Kant, toWards perpetual peace and other WritinGs on politics, 
peace, and history 67 (Pauline Kleingeld ed., David L. Colclasure trans., 2006)). 
112 John raWls, political liberalism (1993).
113 habermas, supra note 75. On the continuity between modern individualism 
and the communicative political theory, see Armin von Bogdandy & Sergio 
Dellavalle, Universalism Renewed: Habermas’ Theory of International Order 
in Light of Competing Paradigms, 10 Ger. l.J. 5 (2009). 
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of the individual, political contractualism generated the conditions for the 
development of both the liberal and the democratic theory of society and state.
How revolutionary the contract theory of state was can easily be seen if 
we compare Hobbes’s concept of sovereignty with Bodin’s, which had been 
formulated just a few decades earlier. In general, Bodin and Hobbes are both 
regarded as the founders of the idea of absolute sovereign power. In this sense, 
they are commonly located within the horizon of the same political project 
with a largely identical outcome. Yet this conclusion is far from exhaustive. 
Indeed, Bodin’s sovereign power derives its absoluteness from a natural 
condition of superiority.114 To the contrary, Hobbes’s concept is the product of 
a free decision of the members of the community, who — originally free and 
not subject to any natural authority — come to the conclusion that the most 
reasonable guarantee of a peaceful life consists in handing over all original 
rights, with only marginal exceptions, to a sovereign vested with almost 
unlimited competences.115 Thus, while Bodin’s sovereign is generated by 
nature or God, which or who created an original condition of diversity among 
human beings, Hobbes’s sovereign power arises from the very basis of the 
social community. Moreover, the bottom-up conception of political power 
of contractualism is not only new if compared to Bodin’s absolutistic theory, 
but also unprecedented if set against previous ideas of popular power. Indeed, 
visions of popular power — or even of democracy — had been elaborated 
already in ancient times116 as well as within the context of Calvinist political 
theology.117 In both cases, however, the will of the people was limited by 
predetermined constraints based on uncontested mythological or theological 
truths. In contractualism, instead, no restriction is supposed to exist but the 
rights, interests and reason of the involved. 
The instruments that contractualism uses to realize the synergy of sovereignty 
and property by maintaining the publicness of the former and the centrality of 
the irreducible individuality of all involved that should characterize the latter 
are twofold. First, the authors who belong to this strand of political thinking 
114 See supra Part II.
115 hobbes, de cive, supra note 108, bk. II, ch. V, para. 7; hobbes, leviathan, 
supra note 108, bk. XVII.
116 thucydides, supra note 7, bk. II, para. 37 et seq.
117 théodore de bèze, du droit des maGistrats sur leur subJets (EDHIS 1977) 
(1575) (translated to English in theodore beza, concerninG the riGhts oF 
rulers over their subJects and the duty oF subJects toWards their rulers 
(Henry-Louis Gonin trans.), http://www.constitution.org/cmt/beza/magistrates.htm 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2017)); Johannes althusius, politica methodice diGesta 
(Harvard University Press 1932) (1614) (translated to English in Johannes 
althusius, politica (Frederick Smith Carney trans., 1992)).
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resort to a private law concept, namely the contract, to explain and justify the 
creation of a sovereign public power. By doing so, they switch over, for the first 
time in history, from the traditional verticality of sovereign power as a quasi-
natural constant opposed to politically passive subjects, to an understanding 
of power as a variable depending on the reflexive decisions of politically 
active and horizontally organized citizens. Furthermore, the option in favor 
of the contract as the fundament of public power makes it clear that the state 
should not be seen simply as a “given fact,” as an administrative monster 
that — grounded on tradition and not seldom on brute force — swallows the 
rights and interests of the subjects independently of their will and to the benefit 
of the rulers. Rather, it can also be conceived of as an instrument based on 
fundamental agreements and at the service of the citizens.
The second feature of the contractualistic synergy of sovereignty and 
property refers to the centrality of a private sphere for the individuals to build 
that kind of reflexive personality that distinguishes a citizen from a subject and 
creates the basis for a legitimate and functioning political life. It is essential 
for the development of sound individual personalities that every member of 
the community can pursue his/her priorities insofar as these preferences do 
not conflict with the justified rights of others. For this purpose, individual 
resources — and, thus, private property — are needed. The defense of private 
property plays therefore a significant role in the conception of all exponents 
of political contractualism, with differences according to their diverging 
political views. In fact, the gamut ranges quite widely, from Hobbes’s rather 
marginal right to private “happiness” that individuals retain after having 
transferred most rights to the newly established public power,118 to Locke’s 
minimal state as the guarantor of private interests,119 with Kant — who 
strongly supported private property, but also considered public autonomy, not 
private interests, as the main goal of the societas civilis — situated about in 
the middle.120 Anyway, no supporter of contractualism ever backed the idea 
of a sovereign power structurally bound to the interests of the few,121 or of a 
system of private property that substitutes for the public domain.
118 hobbes, de cive, supra note 108, bk. II, ch. XIII, para. 2 et seq.; hobbes, 
leviathan, supra note 108, bk. XVI.
119 locKe, supra note 109, bk. II, ch. IX, para. 123 et seq.
120 Kant, supra note 73, § 8, at 365, § 46, at 432.
121 Contractualism derives sovereign power from the reflexive will of all those 
involved. In principle, no restriction is due from the conceptual point of view. 
Nevertheless, many restrictions were actually applied as a consequence of the 
prejudices that afflicted the society in which the authors lived. It is always 
disturbing — just to make an example — to read how Kant justified the exclusion 
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However, if a very central position is assigned to private property, and since 
private wealth tends to accumulate in the hands of a small number of members 
of the society, an acute problem of injustice is likely to arise, putting at risk 
the unity of private property and individual emancipation that characterized 
the original articulation of contractualism. The question is how property can 
be safeguarded in its quality as an instrument for the free development of the 
personality of all individuals. Interestingly, the issue of property limitation 
for the sake of justice was addressed early in the history of contractualism. 
The fact that we can find it in the works of the radical democrat Rousseau 
may be less surprising;122 to the contrary, it is quite astonishing that even the 
“liberal” Locke seems to be perfectly aware of the risks of an unlimited right to 
property.123 In John Rawls’s rediscovery of contract theory, the response to the 
problem has taken the more formal shape of a Pareto optimal solution, in the 
sense that inequality of property and resources can only be justified insofar as 
the less privileged also benefit from this.124 Beyond traditional contractualism, 
the limitation of private property in order to maintain equal and just chances 
for all has been seen as the task of a communicatively grounded political 
power which is committed to safeguarding all human and citizens’ rights, 
including the social ones.125 Or, from a private law perspective, it has been 
seen as an intersubjective duty of private individuals, even before the public 
power intervenes and regardless of what it may do to meet the challenge.126
from political participation of some social groups, in particular women and 
employed workers. See id. § 46, at 432 et seq.
122 Rousseau criticized the unlimited expansion of private possession which can 
jeopardize social cohesion and may be seen as the root of many of the worst social 
pathologies. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur l’Origine de l’Inegalité 
parmi les Hommes, in Jean-Jacques rouusseau, schriFten zur KulturKritiK 
61 (Meiner 1983) (1755) (translated to English in Jean-Jacques rousseau, 
discourse on the oriGin oF inequality (Donald A. Cress trans., 1992)). Yet 
after the stipulation of the “social contract” property is officially recognized and 
protected, see rousseau, supra note 110, bk. I, ch. IX, but should be limited in 
its amount, id. bk. III, ch. IV. 
123 locKe, supra note 109, bk. II, ch. V, para. 35.
124 John raWls, a theory oF Justice 57, 263 (rev. ed. 1999) (originally published 
in 1971).
125 habermas, supra note 75, at 151 et seq.
126 Dagan & Dorfman, supra note 27; Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just 
Relationships, 116 colum. l. rev. 1395 (2016).
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v. concluSIon: from Self-denyIng  
colonIzatIon to Synergy
Sovereignty and property are treacherous twins. They are related because they 
both originate from the turn to individualism at the beginning of the Modern 
Ages. Each of them, however, maybe as a consequence of their historical and 
conceptual connection, also tends to incorporate the other side, subverting 
it to its own purposes. Yet, by colonizing the other side, both sovereignty 
and property deny their own respective functions, thus giving up the core 
element of their social raison d’être. In fact, absolute sovereignty — be it 
political, nationalist, or technocratic — seizes civil society, making it to the 
property of a small group of individuals. In doing so, nonetheless, it loses its 
specific publicness in the service of common interests, transforming public 
power into a support for the selfish benefits of the few. Analogously, but in 
mirror-inverted perspective, the system of private property has laid claim to 
possessing constitutional rank. This ambition gives expression to the growing 
relevance of economic global players, which are hardly willing to submit to 
the supremacy of shared interests, regardless of whether these are embedded 
in national or international public laws and practices. The constitutionalization 
of the system of private property, however, also jeopardizes the social meaning 
of property, which should consist in guaranteeing the means for the self-
realization of every individual.
Does the self-denying mutual colonization of sovereignty and property 
mean that no balance can be found between them? Not necessarily. In fact, 
a third perspective is possible, from which sovereignty and property can 
coexist while perfectly maintaining their respective spheres of realization 
and functions. In this third implementation — or stage — of their dialectics, 
sovereignty and property support each other synergistically, but under the 
condition that three main requirements are satisfied. First, sovereignty has 
to be understood not as a power that precedes individual decisions and may 
degenerate into an instrument in the hands of privileged individuals or social 
groups, but as a creation of the free will of all those involved. Second, private 
property should always acknowledge the superiority of a public dimension 
in which shared interests are discursively formulated. And, third, private 
property should be guaranteed, as an instrument of self-realization, to every 
member of society. If we want to lead the possible solution back to its more 
concise expression, we could say that the three core principles are: freedom 
of all, participation by all, and justice for all.
